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Abstract 
Shariah Advisory Council ('SAC') is established under the Central Bank of Malaysia 
Act 2009 (Act 701). SAC acts as an authority for the ascertainment of lslamic law for 
the purposes of lslamic banking/financial business. The Central Bank of Malaysia and 
the lslamic Financial institutions ('IFIS') shall consult SAC in respect of lslamic banking1 
financial business and affairs. The decision of SAC is binding on IFls, the Central Bank 
of Malaysia, the Shariah Committee, the court of law and the arbitrators on matters 
pertaining to lslamic bank/ng/financial matters. This paper highlights the features that 
SAC have in the context of Malaysian lFls through the existing legal framework. Further. 
it discusses some issues concerning SAC. This paper is a fruit of a pure legal research 
on the features and issues of SAC in the Malaysian IFls. At the ending part of th~s 
paper, the authors provide certain recommendations in regard to the issues discussed. 
Keywords: Shariah Advisory Committee (SAC); Features; Issues; Malaysia; lslamic 
Financial Institutions. 
Introduction 
lslamic bankinglfinancial businesses are governed by the lslamic Financial Services Act 2013 
(Act 759) ('IFSA'). Pursuant to section 2 of the IFSA, 'lslamic banking business' means the 
business of - 
a. accepting lslamic deposits on current account, deposit account, savings account or other 
similar accounts, with or without the business of paying or collecting cheques drawn by 
or paid in by customers; or 
b. accepting money under an investment account; and 
c. provision of finance; and 
d. such other business as prescribed under section 3" 
However, the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009(Act 701)('CBMA1) does not use 'lslamic 
banking business'. Instead it uses the word 'Islamic financial institutions'. According to the 
CBMA the word 'Islamic financial institutions' means a financial institution carrying on lslamic 
financial business (section 2 of the CBMA). While the word 'lslamic financial business' means 
any financial business in Malaysian Ringgit ('MYR') or other currency which is subject to the 
laws enforced by the Central Bank (BNM) and consistent with Shariah (section 2 of the CBMA). 
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Pursuant to section 3 of the IFSA (Prescription by Minister of additional business or activity), 
the Minister may, on the recommendation of the Bank, prescribe- 
a. any business or activity as an addition to the definition of- 
(i) "lslamic banking business"; 
(ii) "international lslamic banking business"; 
(iii) "lslamic financial intermediation activities"; 
(iv) "lslamic factoring business"; or 
(v) "lslamic leasing business", 
and upon such prescription, the definition as added to shall be deemed to be an integral 
part of this Act as from the date of such prescription, or from such later date as may be 
specified in the order; and 
b. any business, service or activity in relation to a financial service as an lslamic financial 
advisory business for the purposes of the definition of "lslamic financial advisory businessn 
under subsection 2(1)" 
The word 'Minister' in the above provision means the Minister for the time being charged with 
the responsibility of finance (section 2 of the IFSA). Thus, the Minister of Finance is the 
Minister meant by section 2. 
The issue that this paper deals with is in regard to the immunity and superiority of the SAC. 
This feature is in accordance with the provisions of IFSA and CBMA. It is opined that, the 
immunity and superiority conferred on the SAC may be abusive and can be detrimental to the 
rights and interests of the customer stakeholders in IFls. There may be SAC'S decisions relating 
to lslamic bankinglfinancial products that are not compatible with lslamic law and equity. As 
the SAC is conferred with statutory immunity and superiority, no person or no court of law can 
correct and rectify the wrong decisions, either procedural or substantive, made by the SAC. 
For an instance, Bay' Bithaman a/-Ajil (BBA) (i.e sale by deferred payment) being an lslamic 
bankinglfinancial product as practised in Malaysia is legal according to the SAC. Nonetheless. 
the SAC fails to envisage the issue abandonment of housing development projects due to the 
faults of the housing developers in BBA. In abandoned housing projects, the aggrieved purchasers 
who use BBA to finance the purchase of houses are still required to pay monthly installments 
to the lslamic banks despite not having obtained vacant possession of the duly completed 
housing units and suffered various grievances. There is no terms in the BBA that provide 
aggrieved purchasers in abandoned housing projects with any adequate remedies and rights 
against gharar (uncertainty and inability of the bankldeveloper to deliver duly completed house). 
However under lslamic law, the vendor (the bankldeveloper) should ensure that the housing 
projects can be delivered to the purchasers. If the vendor fails to deliver duly completed houses 
in accordance with the specifications of the sale and purchase agreement, the vendor, being 
the defaulting party, should pay corresponding damages and compensation or in the worst 
scenario, the banks should return back all moneys received including paying compensation to 
the aggrieved purchasers.' 
One of the issues relating to abandoned housing projects in Malaysia is this: the aggrieved 
purchasers in abandoned housing projects who obtained lslamic Home Financing through BBA 
are still required to settle the monthly installments to the lslamic bank despite failure of the 
vendor to deliver vacant possession. If they (the purchasers) fail, they will be subject to legal 
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actions. In this situation, in the opinion of the authors BBA as approved by the SAC is invalid 
and inequitable affronting the principles of lslamic Law of contract. lslamic banks as the vendor 
should be held responsible if abandonment occurs, not that the lslamic banks blaming the 
aggrieved purchasers for the occurrences of abandoned housing projects due to the faults of 
the developers. 
Questions to Ponder 
There are some questions that can be raised following the above elaboration, viz 
1. Whether the SAC as a public authority is duty bound and under a legal responsibility in 
approving lslamic bankinglfinancial products to ensure public welfare, public benefit and 
well-being of the customer stakeholders? 
2. Does the SAC as a public authority owe a legal responsibility to implement a duty to act 
fairly and reasonably, in good faith and observe rules of natural justice in the exercise of 
their power to the effect of ensuring the legality under lslamic law and equity for approving 
lslamic bankinglfinancial products before the products can be applied by lslamic banks? 
3. If so, whether the aggrieved customers for instance the purchasers in problematic and 
abandoned housing development projects have any cause of action andlor locus stand; to 
sue the SAC and claim appropriate remedies (legal and equitable) for all the losses and 
injuries they suffered and incurred for all the negligence, breach of a duty to act fairly and 
reasonably, failure to implement fairness in the decision making process andlor breach of 
natural justice and good faith in approving lslamic banking products? 
4. Whether the ouster clauses under the IFSA and CBMA giving immunity to the SAC against 
any legal action can negate the power of the court for judicial review or other equitable 
relief? 
Objectives 
The objectives of this paper are as follows: 
1. To examine the extent of legal liability and responsibility of the SAC towards the stakeholder 
customers in approving lslamic bankinglfinancial products; and, 
2. To make certain recommendations insofar as the issue of legal liability and responsibility of 
the SAC in approving lslamic bankinglfinancial products is concerned for the benefit and 
welfare of the stakeholders (for example the purchasers in housing development projects). 
The Statutory Provisions RelatingTo the SAC 
The obligation to comply with Shariah (Islamic Law) in all the activities of the institutions 
carrying out lslamic banking business is clearly spelt out in section 28. Section 28(1) of the 
IFSA (Duty of Institution to Ensure Compliance with Shariah) provides as follows: 
'?In institution shall at all times ensure that its aims and operations, business, affairs and 
activities are in compliance with Shariah" 
Similarly this obligation is spelt out in section 28(2) of the IFSA, which reads: 
"For the purposes of this Act, a compliance with any ruling of the Shariah Advisory Council 
in respect of any particular aim and operation, business, affair or activity shall be deemed 
to be a compliance with Shariah in respect of that aims and operations, business, affair or 
activity" 
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The word 'institution' in the above provision means an authorized person or operator or a designated 
payment system (section 27 of the IFSA). While the words 'authorized person means a person 
licensed under section 10 or approved under section 11 to carry on an authorized business 
(section 2 of the IFSA). 'The word 'operator' and 'designated payment system' are respectively 
defined as 'any person, acting alone or under an arrangement with another person, responsible for 
the rules, procedures and operations of a payment system' and 'a payment system prescribed as 
a designated payment system under subsection 39(1) (section 2 of the IFSA). 
Sections 10 and 11 meanwhile deal specifically on the grant of licence by the Minister and 
Approval by the Bank. 
An institution carrying out lslamic bankinglfinancial business is under a responsibility to do 
certain acts once it found that the business that it carries out has contravened Shariah. The 
responsibility to act is prescribed by section 28(3) IFSA. Section 28(3) reads: 
"Where an institution becomes aware that it is carrying on any of its business, affair or 
activity in a manner which is not in compliance with Shariah or the advice of its Shariah 
committee or the advice or ruling of the Shariah Advisory Council, the institution shall - 
a) immediately notify the Bank and its Shariah committee of the fact; 
b) immediately cease from carrying on such business, affair or activity and from taking 
on any other similar business, affair or activity; and 
c) within thirty days of becoming a ware of such non-compliance or such further period as 
may be specified by the Bank, submit to the Bank a plan on the rectification of the 
non-compliance"(emphasis added). 
As a sanction to the obligation to carry out the above prescribed duties, section 28(4) provides 
as follows: 
"Any person who contravenes subsection (1) or (3) commits an offence and shall, on 
conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding eight years or to a fine 
not exceeding twenty-five million ringgit or to both"(emphasis added). 
SAC is a council established by BNM pursuant to section 51 of CBMA. Section 51 (1) of the 
CBMA (Establishment of SAC) provides: 
"The Bank may establish a Shariah Advisory Council on Finance which shall be the authority 
for the ascertainment of lslamic law for the purposes of lslamic financial business" 
The word 'Bank' here refers to the Central Bank of Malaysia or in Bahasa Malaysia is called 
Bank Negara Malaysia ('BNM')(section 2 of the CBMA). 
The SAC shall be the authority for the ascertainment of lslamic Law for the purpose of lslamic 
bankinglfinancial business (section 51 of the CBMA). 
It is a duty of the BNM and lFls to consult the SAC pursuant to sections 55(1) and 55(2) of 
the CBMA in respect of lslamic bankinglfinancial business and conducting its affairs. Section 
55(1) of the CBMA states: 
"The Bank shall consult the Shariah Advisory Council on any matter- 
a. relating to lslamic financial business; and 
b. for the purpose of carrying out its functions or conducting its business or affairs under 
this Act or any other written law in accordance with the Shariah, which requires the 
ascertainment of lslamic law by the Shariah Advisory Council" 
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The purpose of consulting, referring and seeking advice from the SAC is to make sure that the 
lslamic bankinglfinancial business and its affairs are conducted in accordance with the 
requirements of Shariah (section 55(2) of the CBMA). Section 55(2) of the CBMA provides: 
'Any lslamic financial institution in respect of its lslamic financial business, may- 
a. refer for a ruling; or 
b. seek the advice, 
of the Shariah Advisory Council on the operations of its business in order to ascertain that 
it does not involve any element which is inconsistent with the Shariah" 
Apart for sections 51 and 55, sections 56(1), 57 and 58 of the CBMA also prescribes that the 
rulings and advice of the SAC shall bind the IFls, the BNM, the Shariah Committee, the court 
of law and the arbitrators on matters pertaining to lslamic financial matters. 
Section 56(1) (Reference to SAC for ruling from court or arbitrator) of the CBMA provides: 
"Where in any proceedings relating to lslamic financial business before any court or arbitrator 
any question arises concerning a Shariah matter, the court or the arbitrator, as the case 
may be, shall- 
a. take into consideration any published rulings of the Shariah Advisory Council; or 
b. refer such question to the Shariah Advisory Council for its rulingJ'(emphasis added). 
Section 57 of the CBMA (Effect of Shariah rulings) states as follows: 
'Xny ruling made by the Shariah Advisory Council pursuant to a reference made under this 
Part shall b e  binding on the lslamic financial institutions under section 55 and the court 
or arbitrator making a reference under section 56"(emphasis added). 
While section 58 of the CBMA (SAC ruling prevails) provides: 
"Where the ruling given by a Shariah body or committee constituted in Malaysia by an 
lslamic financial institution is different from the ruling given by the Shariah Advisory Council, 
the ruling o f  the Shariah Advisory Council shall prevail"(emphasis added). 
Thus, pursuant to the above provisions, the rulings and advice of the SAC shall bind the IFls, 
the court of law, the arbitrator and the Shariah committee. In other words, the new provision 
inserted in the CBMA in relation to the SAC, serve as ouster clause to oust any jurisdiction 
and power of the court of law, any other Shariah committee of the lFls and any other persons 
to challenge the rulings and advice of the SAC in respect of lslamic financial business and 
affairs (Md. Dahlan and Aljunid, 2010). 
Apart from complying with Shariah and the SAC, the institution carrying out lslamic banking1 
financial business must follow the standards set out by the BNM and the SAC. 'This is mentioned 
in section 29. Failure to carry out this obligation will trigger certain punishment pursuant to 
section 29(6), which provides: 
'Any person who fails to comply with any standards specified under subsection ( I ) ,  commits 
an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
eight years or to a fine not exceeding twenty-five million ringgit or to both" 
Similarly, all persons, including the IFls, are duty bound to comply with the directions (written 
circulars, guidelines and notices) of the BNM on any Shariah matter relating to the lslamic 
bankinglfinancial business. These directions are made in accordance with the advice of the 
SAC. Any person who fails to comply with any of these directions, commit an offence and 
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shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding three million ringgit (section 59(1)(2)(3) of 
the CBMA). 
In addition to the above, the lFls must also comply with the advice of its internal Shariah 
Committee. This is spelt out under section 30(1) of the IFSA. 
It is noteworthy that the lFls must also establish their own internal Shariah Committee to 
advise its business, affairs and activities in order to ensure that it complies with Shariah (section 
30(1) of the IFSA). The duties and functions that the Shariah Committee carries out must also 
be consistent with the standards prescribed by the BNM (section 32 of the IFSA). 
Cases on  the Superiority and Hegemony of the SAC 
The superiority and hegemony of the SAC over the court, the IFls, the arbitrator and the 
Shariah Committee in relation to the Islamic bankinglfinancial business and affairs has been 
given judicial support and recognition by recent cases namely: 
1. Bank lslam Malaysia Bhd Iwn Rhea Zadani Corp Sdn Bhd dan lain-lain [2012] 10 MLJ 484 
(High Court at Kuala Lumpur); 
2. Bank Muamalat Malaysia Bhd Iwn Kong Sun Enterprise Sdn Bhd dan lain-lain [2012] 10 
MLJ 665 (High Court at Johor Bahru); 
3. ClMB lslamic Bank Bhd v LCL Corp Bhd & Anor [2012] 3 MLJ 869 (High Court at Kuala 
Lumpur); 
4. Kuwait Finance House (M) Bhd Iwn Teknogaya Diversified Sdn Bhd dan lain-lain [2012] 9 
MLJ 433 (High Court at Kuala Lumpur); 
5. Mayban Trustees Bhd v ClMB Bank Bhd and other appeals [2012] 2 MLJ 187; [2012] 6 
MLJ 354 (Court of Appeal at Putrajaya); 
6. Mayban Trustees Bhd v ClMB Bank Bhd and other appeals [2012] 6 MLJ 354 (Court of 
Appeal at Putrajaya); 
7. Mohd Alias bin lbrahim v RUB Bank Bhd & Anor [2012] 1 ShLR 23; [2011] 3 MLJ 26 (High 
Court at Kuala Lumpur); 
8. Tan Sri Abdul Khalid bin lbrahim v Bank lslam Malaysia Bhd [2012] 1 ShLR 1 ; [2012] 7 
MLJ 597 (High Court at Kuala Lumpur); 
9. Tan Sri Abdul Khalid bin lbrahim v Bank lslam Malaysia Bhd [2013] 3 MLJ 269 (Court of 
Appeal at Putrajaya); and, 
10. Tan Sri Abdul Khalid bin lbrahim v Bank lslam Malaysia Bhd and another suit [2009] 6 MLJ 
416 (High Court at Kuala Lumpur); 
Liability and Responsibility of the SAC 
In the opinion of the authors, despite the absolute power and immunity that the SAC has in 
Islamic bankinglfinancial business and affairs and its hegemony and superiority, it is submitted 
the SAC is still subject to a legal duty, not just under Shariah, to act fairly and reasonably in 
the exercise of their powers. In other words, if it is proven that the SAC fails to execute its 
statutory duties fairly and reasonably to the detriment of the customer stakeholders, the latter 
shall have a cause of action and locus stand; against the SAC and are entitled to certain legal 
and equitable remedies. This contention is made on the following grounds: 
1. There exists a fiduciary duty on part of the SAC towards the public customer stakeholders 
in dispensing their public duties. For instance, in financing housing development projects, 
the public customerslstakeholders are the housing developers and the purchasers; 
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2. There exists a legitimate expectation on part of the customer stakeholders against the SAC 
in that the SAC should exercise its statutory andlor prerogative powers conferred by the 
IFSA and CBMA in a fair and reasonable manner in dispensing its statutory duties for the 
benefit of its stakeholders (for example the housing developers and the purchasers); and, 
3. Even though the SAC has an absolute statutory power over the Islamic bankinglfinancial 
business and affairs, this statutory power is not an unfettered one. 'This power is still 
subject to the principles of natural justice, equity, good faith and fairness. 
Fiduciary Duty 
It is submitted that the duty of the SAC to exercise due care in exercising its duties under the 
IFSA and CBMA is a fiduciary one. The SAC should ensure that the outcome of its decision 
in lslamic bankinglfinancial business and affairs would benefit the public customer stakeholders 
and should not cause any unnecessary and gratuitous problems to the customer stakeholders. 
This duty is enunciated in Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors v Sagong bin Tasi & Ors [2005] 6 
MLJ 289 (Court of Appeal). In this case, the State Government of Selangor (the first defendant- 
owner of all un-alienated land in the state) was held liable to have acquired the land (Bukit 
Tampoi) occupied and belonging to the plaintiffs (aboriginal peoples) with the second defendant 
(UEM Berhad), third defendant (Malaysian Highway Authority) and fourth defendant (Federal 
Government), by depriving the plaintiffs' proprietary rights without adequate compensation in 
accordance with the Land Acquisition Act 1960 ('LAA'). Secondly, the defendants were liable 
for having unlawfully evicted the plaintiffs from their lands as the 14 day notice was unreasonable 
and insufficient, not being compliant with the LAA procedure. The defendants were also liable 
for trespass. 
The first defendant had also breached their fiduciary duties in not having gazetted the un- 
gazetted area for the welfare and benefit of the plaintiffs as an aboriginal reserve area. They 
failed to gazette the area despite their knowledge and awareness that such non-gazetted area 
was also occupied and needed by the plaintiffs to carry out their customary practices. 
The court held that the discretionary power of the State Authority or public body is not an 
unfettered one in light of its responsibility towards the welfare and in trust of its subjects 
(stakeholders). The exercise of the power must be in accordance with the law and for public 
good. Thus it follows that they are fiduciary to the public. 
The above principles are also found in Australian cases in Mabo No 2 (Mabo & Ors v State of 
Queensland & Anor [ I  9861 64 ALR 1 and Wik People's v The State of Queensland & Ors 
[ I  9961 187 CLR 1. In other parts of the commonwealth this principle is also entrenched in 
many cases such as Premanchandra v Major Montague Jayawickrema [I9941 2 Sri LR 90. In 
this case at page 105, GPS De Silva CJ when delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court 
of Sri Lanka said: 
"There are no absolute or unfettered discretions in public law; discretion are conferred 
on public functionaries in trust for the public, to be used for the public good, and the 
propriety of the exercise of such discretions is to be judged by reference to the 
purposes for which they were so entrusted" (emphasis added). 
In Malaysia the above principle had also been adopted in Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Wilayah 
Persekutuan v Sri Lempah Enterprise Sdn. Bhd [ I  9791 1 MLJ 135 and Savrimuthu v Public 
Prosecutofll987] 2 MLJ 173. 
It is submitted, a fiduciary duty exists on part of the SAC in exercise of its statutory powers in 
Islamic bankinglfinancial business and affairs. Following this, it must obtain the requisite advice 
Proceedings of the AGBA 1 l th World Congress, New Delhi, India, November, 2014 1 5  
Advances in Global Business Research Vol. 11 No. 1 - ISSN 1549-9332 
and views from all relevant parties (including the consumers and purchasers' associations) and 
comply with the advice and views before approving any proposed lslamic bankinglfinancial 
products. The SAC should also decide prudently in a reasonably manner supported by the 
advice by the appropriate segments of society before approving any lslamic bankinglfinancial 
products. Even though based on the authors' view there has not yet any case law pointing to 
this position, it is submitted the SAC is under a fiduciary duty in carrying out public duties, for 
instance in making decision in approving lslamic bankinglfinancial products. 
Legitimate Expectation 
Before elaboratirlg on the above sub-heading, the authors would like to raise a question: Whether 
the aggrieved customer stakeholders in lslamic bankinglfinancial business and affairs has a 
legitimate expectation against the SAC that the SAC would approve suitable, equitable, well- 
balanced and all-inclusive lslamic bankinglfinancial products up to the extent of protecting the 
rights and interests of the customer stakeholders as well? 
The principle behind the doctrine of legitimate expectation is founded on the duty to act fairly 
as a necessity element or concomitant of good governance or good administration.'The doctrine 
of legitimate expectation was initially recognized by Lord Denning in Schmidt v Secretary of 
State for Home Affairs [I9691 2 Ch 149 (CA) to denote something less than a right which may 
nevertheless be protected by the principles of natural justice; or an expectation of receiving 
some benefit or privilege to which the individual has no right. 
In the Privy Council case of Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [I9831 2 AC 629 
(Privy Council (PC')), Ng Yuen Shiu an illegal immigrant challenged a deportation order. He 
contended that the Hong Kong government had previously given an undertaking that each case 
would be considered on its merits and that he was denied the opportunity of being heard. The 
PC held that Ng had a legitimate expectation that a certain procedure would be followed and 
that it was in the interest of good administration that the authorities should act fairly by 
implementing its stated policy. Lord Fraser said that 'legitimate expectation in this context are 
capable of including expectations which go beyond enforceable legal rights, provided they have 
some reasonable basis'. His Lordship identified three practical questions underlying all legitimate 
expectation cases. They are: 
a. To what has the authority committed itself? 
b. Has the authority acted unlawfully in respect of its commitment? 
c. What should the court do about it? 
In Darahman bin lbrahim & Ors v Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Perlis & Ors [2008] 4 MLJ 
309, at page 333, the Court of Appeal said that where an applicant can demonstrate that a 
legitimate expectation has arisen, he has a powerful argument against a public body which has 
otherwise acted pursuant to the discretionary powers or duties lawfully conferred upon it. It is 
germane to state that a legitimate expectation in its procedural form arises where there has 
been a failure to follow an agreed or customary, process of consultation. In the main, it is 
concerned about the quality of the decision making process. The latter is called substantive 
legitimate expectation, while the former is known as procedural legitimate expectation. 
In Dr Michael Jeyakumar Devaraj v Ketua Pengarah Unit Penyelarasan Pelaksanaan di Jabatan 
Perdana Menteri & Ors [2011] 6 M U  824 (High Court at Kuala Lumpur) the argument of legitimate 
expectation was successfully pleaded by the applicant and the court agreed that legitimate 
expectation arose in the circumstance of this case. In this case the court held the application 
of the applicant being a Member of Parliament for the Sungai Siput constituency for leave for 
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judicial review against the decision of the respondents (being the Director General of the 
Implementation Coordination Unit (ICU) of the Prime Minister's Department and the Director of 
the Perak State Development) who rejected the applicant's application for funds from the special 
constituency allowance for schools, orphanage and aid to the orang asli was allowed by the 
court. The court stated that the exercise of discretion on part of the respondents in dealing 
with the application of the applicant may well be based on policy considerations within the 
management prerogative but the respondents evidently had acted capriciously and in breach of 
the legitimate expectation that they owed to the applicant, with bias and/or for improper purpose, 
had failed to take into account relevant factors and had taken into account irrelevant factors. 
In Sipadan Dive Sdn Bhd & Ors v The State Government of the State of Sabah [201 I]  3 MLJ 
357 (High Court of Borneo at Kota Kinabalu) again the court found that legitimate expectation 
existed on part of the State Government towards the plaintiffs. In this case the plaintiffs were 
awarded by the court compensation or damages as the defendant being the state government 
had breached the plaintiffs' legitimate expectation in that the plaintiffs were not given reasonable 
notice to wind down their business that had resulted in the plaintiffs' losses due to the demolition 
of the plaintiffs' buildings by the defendant and losses of the plaintiffs' equitable or proprietary 
interests in the plaintiffs' diving resorts. The legitimate expectation was also created on the 
request of the defendant that the fifth plaintiff was to prepare a master plan proposed for Pulau 
Sipadan. Further, legitimate expectation existed when the plaintiffs were allowed to continue 
operating on Sipadan island even after Malaysia had gained sovereignty over the island. 
Evidence which the plaintiffs relied on is that the defendant actively used the presence of the 
plaintiffs on the island to promote Malaysia's tourism industry and to argue Malaysia's sovereignty 
rights over the island at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Khan [I9851 1 All ER 40 (Court 
of Appeal, Civil Division), Watkins LJ said at page 41 as follows: 
"where a member of the public affected by a decision of a public authority had a legitimate 
expectation based on a statement or undertaking by the authority that it would apply 
certain criteria or follow certain procedure in reaching its decision, the authority was 
under a duty to follow those criteria or procedures" (emphasis added). 
The case of R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan (Secretary of State 
for Health and another intervening) [2000] 3 All ER 850 provides an example of what amounts 
to substantive legitimate expectation. In that case, a tetraplegic victim of a road accident in 
1993 was housed in a health institute called Mardon House, a NHS facility for the long term 
disabled. It was represented to the victim by the health authority that he could stay at Mardon 
House 'for as long as they chose'. When the health authority decided to close Mardon House 
without providing alternative suitable accommodation, the Court of Appeal held that, in view of 
the representation, a breach of this legitimate expectation amounted to an abuse of power and 
the substantive promise was upheld. 
In Toh Huat Khay v Lim A Chang (in his capacity as the executor of the estate of Toh Hoy 
Khay, deceased) [2010] 4 MLJ 312 (Federal Court at Putrajaya), legitimate expectation existed 
on part of the State Authority to ensure that the requirements of the law relating to the land 
transfer must be observed and complied with. The court also held that due to this the State 
Authority breached its fiduciary duty. In this case the State Authority consented to a land 
transfer despite the fact that it is still subject to restrictions in interests of 10 years prohibition 
of sale, from the date of alienation. Due to this, the court held that the transfer was null and 
void, despite there being a consent gi ven by the State Authority. It follows that, according to 
the court, such a transfer could not give any indefeasibility of title to the transferee as the 
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registration of the land was procured by means of an insufficient or void instrument pursuant to 
section 340(2)(b) of the NLC. 
Thus, following the above legal principle and courts' decision, in the submission of the authors, 
the aggrieved customer stakeholders in Islamic bankinglfinancial products have a legitimate 
expectation, procedurally and substantively, that the SAC, as a public authority, should have 
approved or should approve suitable Islamic banking products that can also give reciprocal 
protection to customer stakeholders' rights and interests. 
It is submitted that the foundation for the creation of procedural and substantive legitimate 
expectation of the public toward the SAC is derived from the objectives of the Shariah (maqasid 
shariah) itself i.e to protect the rights and interests of the people in term of their life, wealth 
and the inherent responsibility of a public authority to exercise their duties for social justice, 
public good and public welfare/wellbeing. 
From the above cases and discussion, the conclusion is that the SAC owes a fiduciary duty 
and that its subjects (customer stakeholders) have procedural and substantive legitimate 
expectation that it (the SAC) when approving Islamic bankinglfinancial products would approve 
suitable, equitable, fair and all-inclusive products in a professional, fair and reasonable manner 
for the reciprocal benefits of the customer stakeholders. 
Ouster Clauses 
There are cases that held ouster clause given to public authority is ineffective as against the 
power of the court for judicial review or other equitable relief. The immunity given by the ouster 
clause is shattered if the public authority has done some acts which is wrong in law. This 
proposition is supported by the following cases: 
1. Re Racal Communication [I9811 2 AC 374; 
2. Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [I9691 2 AC 147; and, 
3. Council of Civil Service Union v Minister for the Civil Service [I 9851 AC 374 
The ground on which relief and remedies are given to the aggrieved parties has been succinctly 
summarized by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Union under three developed heads, 
viz, 'illegality', irrationality' and 'procedural impropriety'. 
Christopher Leong, President of the Malaysian Bar at the opening of the Legal Year 2014 at 
Dewan Sri Siantan, Perbadanan Putrajaya on 11 January 2014, said that:= 
"Ouster clauses are obnoxious, as they purport to confer absolute powers on the 
Executive and attempt to render the Judiciary subordinate. They are contrary to the 
doctrine of separation of powers that underpins the Federal Constitution and that is 
essential to, and inherent in, a modern democracy that professes and abides by the 
rule of law. Ouster clauses also undermine the rights of aggrieved parties to access 
justice. 
The Judiciary has in some cases stood up and denuded the efficacy of ouster clauses. One 
example is the landmark Court of Appeal case of Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan. This 
decision is an affirmation of the oath that all judges take upon assuming office, that is, to 
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution, and so may this continue" (emphasis added). 
In Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers' Union [I 9951 2 MLJ 317 
(Court of Appeal) at pages 336-344, Gopal Sri Ram JCA said: 
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"The next topic that requires consideration is the ability of the High Court to exercise 
judicial review over awards of the court in the face of a privative clause. The attempt by 
Parliament to exclude judicial review is, in this instance, expressed in s 33B(1) of the 
Act ... a preponderance of lblalaysian authority, when dealing with the precursor to s 33B(1), 
favoured the view that the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction to quash an administrative 
decision for an error of law not going to jurisdiction was not excluded by the ouster clause.. . 
In my opinion, the true principle may be stated as follows. An inferior tribunal or 
other decision making authority, whether exercising a quasi-judicial function or purely 
an administrative function, has no jurisdiction to  commit an error of law. Henceforth, 
i t  i s  no longer of concern whether the error of law is jurisdictional or not. If an 
inferior tribunal or other public decision-taker does make such an error, then he exceeds 
his jurisdiction. So too is jurisdiction exceeded, where resort is  had to  an unfair 
procedure ... or where the decision is reached i s  unreasonable, in the sense that no 
reasonable tribunal similarly circumstanced would have arrived at the impugned 
decision. 
It is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt an exhaustive definition of what amounts to an 
error of law, for the categories of such an error are not closed. But it may be safely said 
that an error of law would be disclosed if the decision-maker asks himself the wrong decision 
or takes into account irrelevant considerations or omits to take into account relevant 
considerations ... or if he misconstrues the terms of any relevant statute, or misapplies or 
misstates a principle of the general law. 
Since an inferior tribunal has no jurisdiction to  make an error of law, i ts decision will 
not be immunized from judicial review by an ouster clause however widely drafted." 
(emphasis added). 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The authors are of the view that in approving Islamic bankinglfinancial products, if proven that 
the products are not suitable and unfair to the customer stakeholders and that due to this 
reason the customer stakeholders become aggrieved, the aggrieved customer stakeholders have 
a good cause of action and locus standi against the SAC if the latter had acted unreasonably, 
unfairly, in breach of natural justice and the legitimate expectation of the customer stakeholders 
and is mala fide. In this regard the aggrieved customer stakeholders may claim for appropriate 
compensation and damages for all the calamities that have occurred due to the failure of the 
SAC to carry out their statutory duties reasonably. 
It is submitted that an amendment should be made to the IFSA and CBMA to the effect of 
imposing an obligation on the SAC to be bound by the principles of administrative law and 
tortuous law in the decision making process in considering and approving Islamic banking1 
financial products in Malaysia. Further the SAC should also be responsible for all the decisions 
made and no immunity should be given to them if proven it has acted unreasonably, unfairly, in 
breach of natural justice and the legitimate expectation of the customer stakeholders and mala 
fide in carrying out their public duties. 
Apart from the legislative proposals above, it is the hope of the authors, there will be, in the 
near future, aggrieved customer stakeholders for an instance the abandoned housing projects' 
purchasers or housing developers who may realize and with proof that their miserable plights 
are due to the failure of the SAC to observe the duty to act fairly and reasonably in the 
exercise of its statutory power in approving Islamic home financial products to take certain 
legal actions against the defaulting SAC for some judicial remedies. Thus, the legal perimeter 
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on the responsibility and liability in implementing public duties by the public bodies in Malaysia 
can be further defined and expounded by the guardian of the law itself. 
Finally the ouster clause conferring immunity on the SAC, in the submission of the authors, is 
ineffective if the SAC, as a public authority in exercising its statutory duties, has transgressed 
the law, i.e has acted unreasonably, unfairly, in breach of natural justice and the legitimate 
expectation of the customer stakeholders and mala fide in carrying out its public duties. 
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